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lea bargaining is spreading into an increasing been a single act of deviant behaviour outside the rule of
number of countries in spite of criticisms of law but has become the rule itself, sanctioned and
scholars around the world. The draw of plea bar- ordered by those in the most powerful positions in
gaining is the notion that with ever-growing crime rates society, whether they are political, military, religious, or
and limited court resources, conducting a full criminal economic leaders. In all situations currently before the
trial for every defendant would be impossible. Practitio- ICC, the violent conflict between the different groups is
ners even claim that still continuing.
without plea bargaining Plea bargaining can support the main goals of Thus the ICC has
the criminal justice system objectives that go
would collapse. However, international criminal justice if used carefully. beyond those of
critics fear that criminals
are rewarded for co-operation with the prosecution
rather than being punished for their crimes, that victims
are shut out from the process, and that defendants are
unduly incited to give up basic due process rights.
Plea bargaining has also been applied in a number of
international criminal tribunals' where it faced similar
criticisms. Due to the very different nature of interna-
tional criminal law, especially the gravity of crimes, it is
often argued that any negotiations with the alleged per-
petrators are unacceptable.2 This article discusses
whether the International Criminal Court (ICC) should
follow the example of other international criminal tribu-
nals and implement a plea bargaining policy.
International crimes are typically committed in the
context of armed conflict where the country or region
has been completely unsettled. Violence has not just
domestic criminal
justice systems. It aspires to replace impunity with
accountability, break the cycle of ethnic violence and ret-
ribution, empower victim groups, facilitate reconcilia-
tion, and restore the rule of law by bringing the guilty to
justice in a fair trial. In addition, the international crimi-
nal trial is expected to build an extensive and objective
historical record so that repetition of the conflict can be
avoided. Furthermore it is hoped that the condemnation
of individuals, rather than political, ethnic, or racial
Thanks go to Dr Keith Cooper for comments on an earlier version of this
article.
1. For example both the UN ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
as well as in the hybrid courts such as the Special Court for Sierra I one and
the Iraqi Special Tribunal.
2. Statement by the president of the ICTY made at a Briefing to Members
of Diplomatic Missions, IT/29, 11 February 1994 quoted in Michael P.
Scharf, Trading Justice Jor 1ficiency, 2 J. Ir' C nRI. JIsr 1070, at 1073
(2004).
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groups, opens the way to the recon-
struction of a split society. The inter-
national criminal process is also
expected to promote human rights
by developing criminal jurisdiction
for human rights violations on the
one hand and due process rights of
the accused on the other. In the face
of these multifaceted functions of
the ICC it has to be questioned to
what extent plea bargaining can be
brought in accordance with the
Court's role.
Proportionate sentence
Each of the major international trea-
ties such as the four Geneva Conven-
tions (1949), the 1948 Genocide
Convention, and the Torture Con-
vention (1984) require proportion-
ate punishment. The Statute of the
ICC (Rome Statute) does not explic-
itly mention proportionate sentenc-
ing but a disproportionate sentence
is ground for appeal for both prose-
cution and defense.' Moreover, the
aspiration to end impunity (as
declared in the preamble) also
means that any punishment is pro-
portionate to the crime. One of the
major criticisms of plea bargaining
is that a sentence reduction based on
a plea agreement reflects neither the
severity of the committed violence or
the blameworthiness of the convict.
Obviously it is impossible to find a
punishment for a perpetrator of
3 Aiticles 81(2) (a), 83(3) Rome Statute.
mass atrocities that mirrors the
crimes. The question is what criteria
should be taken into consideration
when finding a sentence that is just.
The relevant sentencing factors are
set out in Article 78 and Rule 145 of
the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence for the ICC. Except for the
personal circumstances of the defen-
dant, all criteria set out here refer to
the commission of the crime itself
and not to any postfactum behaviour.
While most national criminal justice
systems acknowledge that acts of rec-
onciliation, co-operation with the
authorities, and in particular an
admission of guilt are mitigating
factors, neither the Rome Statute or
the Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence introduce such a principle.
On the other hand, some argue
that plea bargaining does not auto-
matically mean undue low sentences.
The Court always has the discretion
to reject sentences deemed too
lenient because a promise made by
the prosecution to the defense is not
binding on the Court. However, this
is a very formal argument, which
does not take into account the infor-
mal pressure on the Court to encour-
age the practice of plea bargaining
in the long run. Experience at the
International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) has shown that if a
court repeatedly disregards sentence
recommendations agreed by the
parties, future defendants will be
discouraged from entering into plea
negotiations.
One practice of plea bargaining,
which is particularly criticised for
undermining the principles of
justice, is charge bargaining. This is
a form of plea bargaining where the
prosecution drops some of the
charges, with the condition that the
defendant will plead guilty to the
remaining ones. Thus the offender
will not face a trial for a number of
crimes for which the prosecution
had good evidence and a chance to
gain a conviction.
In the ad hoc tribunals charges of
genocide have been frequently
dropped for a guilty plea of crimes
against humanity. Regardless of the
length of the imprisonment, whether
a defendant is convicted for one
account of persecution or several
accounts of genocide, it is decisive
not only for an accurate historical
record but also for the question of
justice. It is not only the length of
the sentence but also the judgement
and its inherent condemnation by
the international community that
make them essential parts ofjustice.
Moreover, not to prosecute an act of
genocide for reasons of efficiency
violates the Genocide Convention.
Plea bargaining indeed bears the
risk of reducing the sentence unduly
in exchange for cooperation after
the crime and leads to convictions
that neither label the crimes com-
mitted accurately nor punish them
proportionately. Nevertheless, does
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plea bargaining have the potential
to serve justice? One must not forget
that every trial carries the risk that a
factually guilty person might be
acquitted because the prosecution
could not prove its case. In interna-
tional criminal law, where investiga-
tion is extremely difficult, this
possibility cannot be underesti-
mated. Plea bargaining does,
however, secure an admission of guilt
and a conviction for just some of the
charges, so a reduced senteice might
be preferable to a complete acquittal
after a full trial.
Legitimacy
The second problem with plea bar-
gaining is that it might have implica-
tions for the legitimacy of the ICC
itself. Unlike national criminal
courts, each of the international
criminal courts and tribunals has
been subjected to attacks on their
legitimacy. From Nuremberg to
Arusha claims of victors' justice were
heard at every tribunal. The ICC,
which even has potentialjurisdiction
over nationals of non-member states,
is facing the same allegations. As a
court that is not an organ of the
United Nations and that can count
only two permanent members of the
Security Council among its member
states, the ICC still has to prove its
legitimacy. Therefore it needs to
demonstrate that it is able to provide
justice through fair trials, whose cor-
rectness is beyond doubt.
Plea bargaining on the other hand
avoids the trial with all its proce-
dural safeguards and thus could give
the impression that the Court prefers
quick case disposals by negotiating
with perpetrators rather than fulfill-
ing its mandate. Moreover, if the
ICC uses principles of complementa-
rity' and insists on investigating
cases by claiming that the national
state is unable or unwilling to pros-
ecute, any case disposed of without a
trial by plea bargaining could
severely damage the Court's claim of
admissibility.
On the other hand, considering
the immense costs of the ICC, the
Court has to deliver results. In spite
of the presumption of innocence
enshrined in the Rome Statute, the
Court's success will not only be mea-
sured by the fairness of its trials but
also by its number of convictions.
Plea bargaining frees the way to quick
and uncontested convictions and sen-
tences. Furthermore, an admission of
guilt confirms that the prosecution
was right to open the case and that
the defendant deserves the sentence
imposed Hence, every defendant
who shows remorse and co-operation
demonstrates that he or she accepts
the Court and its rulings,
In the case of Serbian political
leader Biljana Plaviid the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) noted that
"by surrendering and pleading guilty,
Mrs. Plaviid is also sending a power-
ful message about the legitimacy of
the International Tribunal arid its
functions."' Thus, although plea bar-
gaining carries the risk of underinin-
ing the Court's reputation if it evokes
a picture of unfair backdoor dealing,
it has the potential of raising the
Court's legitimacy by facilitating
more convictions aid exhibiting
major perpetrators acknowledging
the Court
Peace and reconciliation
Besides bringing offenders to justice,
another central function of interna-
tional criminal justice is to support
peace and reconciliation. Plea bar-
gaining can contribute to this aim
too because, in addition to the
admission of responsibility, the
defendant's expression of remorse is
a source for healing. Moreover, the
public acknowledgement of the
victims' suffering can be of immea-
surable value for ongoing peace
efforts. Conversely, one could hold
that the victims deserve these con-
cessions by the perpetrators of
immeasurable suffering without the
defendant being offered a sentence
reward.
What is more, the defendant's
admission of guilt will have little
meaning if it does not convey sincer-
ity. Plaviids admission of responsi-
bility and acknowledgement of the
victims' innocence at the ICTY was
for many Serbs no reason to reassess
the conflict. Many saw her statement
as an act of betrayal of her beliefs in
return for the offers by the Tribu-
nal.6 At the same time, the victims
who welcomed PlaviCs admission
were appalled by the dropping of the
genocide charges and the lenient
sentence' Moreover, further conces-
sions offended the victims and thus
undermined the reconciliatory effect
of the confession.' On top of that,
any possible healing was lost after
Plaviid redacted her confession as
soon as she was released from prison
in 2009.
Plea bargaining has the potential
to make a valuable contribution to
peace and reconciliation but whether
this opportunity materializes will
depend on the circumstances in
each case and cannot be claimed as
a general rule. The ICC will need to
make sure that the impact of each
plea bargain for peace and reconcili-
ation is evaluated individually.
Victims
The ICC is commended for its inno-
vative improvement of the role of
the victim. Prosecution, Pre-trial
Chamber, and Trial Chamber are
required by the Rome Statute to con-
sider the views and concerns of the
victims at all stages.' This under-
standing of the central role of the
victim in international criminal
justice must not be undermined by a
misuse of plea bargaining. The ques-
tion of what impact plea bargaining
has on the interest of the victims is
however ambiguous. An agreement
between defense and prosecution
4. Articles 17 and 18 Rome Statute.
5. Prosecutor v. Biljana Plavii, Sentencing
Judgement, Case No. IT 00-39&40/1, (Feb, 27,
2003) para 76.
6. AlissaJ. Rubin, Fonner Serb Leaders Adnision
of Guilt Alienates Compatriots, Los Angeles Times,
Dec. 16, 2002, at A4.
7. A. Kebo (2003, February, 24-28). Regional
report: Pladid sentence divides Bosnia. Institute for
War and Peace Reporting's Tribunal Update, 302
accessible at http://ww.iwpr.net/?p=tri&s
=f&o=166268&ape state=henitri2003 (last visited
July 2010).
8. Plav4e was sent to a Swedish prison that
offered inmates access to sauna, gym, solarium,
massage room, and, borse-riding paddock,
Patrick McLoughlin, Jail with "human touch' may
await Bosnia's Pllaysi, Reters, June 6, 2003 avail-
able at http://wwv.frecrepublic.com/focus/
f-news/924094/posts (last visited June 2009).
9. See Articles 15 (3), 19(3), 53 (1) (c), 54(1)
(b), 65 (4)(a), 75(1) Rome Statute.
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might have very diverse effects on
different victims.
One of the most important advan-
tages is that an admission of guilt
saves victims the ordeal of testifying.
A trial at an international court
means that the witness usually has to
travel a long way from home to a
foreign country. Moreover, testifying
might put the safety of the witnesses
and their families at risk. Most impor-
tantly, testimony, especially if under
cross-examination, might mean the
witness has to re-live the trauma of
victimization."
Not every victim, however, per-
ceives the trial as an encumbrance.
Active participation in the proce-
dures and the opportunity to tell
their story can, on the contrary, con-
stitute a significant healing factor
However, the avoidance of trial
through plea bargaining deprives
victims of a forum to share their
history with the international com-
munity. Moreover, the public expo-
sure of the perpetrator at trial is part
of the satisfaction brought to the
victims and an important part of the
justice process. It seems unaccept-
able to take this away from victims in
order to shorten the procedure.
On the other hand, the defen-
dant's admission of guilt and
acknowledgement of the victims' suf-
fering induced by a plea agreement
might help victims in their healing
process. Further, many victims might
wish for a quick conviction after a
confession, rather than a judgement
after years of trial and appeal proce-
dures. Additionally, since plea bar-
gaining saves time and resources
spent on trials, more offenders can
be brought to justice, which again is
in the interest of the victims."
10. Prosecutorn. Plavii cFeb 27, 2003 Sentencing
Judgement para 68.
11. Anna Petrig, AegotiatedJustice and the Goals
ofIntemational Ciiminal fibunal,-With a Focus on
the Plea-Baigaining Practice of the ICTY and the Legal
Framework of the ICC, 8 Cm.-Krw J. INT'L AND
Comr. L. 1, at 22 (2008).
12. Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovi and John Hagan, The
Politics of Punishment and the Siege of Sarajevo:
Toward a Conflict Theory offlPeived International
(InJfustice, 40 LAw & Soc x Rex. 369, at 396 (2006).
1. Article 77 Rome Statute.
14. Article 14 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 16 Dec. 1966, 99
U.N.T.S. 171.
15. Articles 76(l), 77, 78(1) Rone Statute.
The crucial downside for victims
is the possible restriction of charges
and the sentence reduction entailed
in the bargain. Those who commit-
ted the most heinous atrocities are
shown leniency for co-operating
with the Court rather than being
severely punished. For example,
empirical research in Sarajevo shows
that in spite of a common view that
trials take too long, only 6 percent of
the respondents approved of plea
bargaining.i1
With no death penalty and life
sentence as an exception'1 the sen-
tence range of the ICC is already
perceived by some as too low and
further reductions would disappoint
many of the victims who had hoped
the ICC would bring justice. When
deciding whether to accept an admis-
sion of guilt according to Article 65
(4) the Trial Chamber can either
request further witness testimonies
from the prosecutor or even decide
to conduct a full trial. Following
from the spirit of this provision,
when considering the possibility of
engaging in plea negotiations, the
prosecution should evaluate in each
case what impact an agreement
would have for the victims.
Defendants
Since one major function of interna-
tional criminal law is to promote
human rights, the ICC must pay
high respect to international defen-
dants' rights such as the right to fair
trial, the right to a public hearing,
the right to examine or have exam-
ined witnesses on their behalf, the
right not to be compelled to testify
against themselves, and most of all
the right to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty14 The core of
plea bargaining is however the avoid-
ance of a full trial, which means that
the defendant loses all these rights.
Nevertheless, the advantages of an
agreement with the prosecution
often outweigh the loss of rights in
the eyes of defendants. If a defen-
dant assumes that there is a realistic
chance of conviction, the possibility
of a withdrawal of the most serious
charges and the promise of a consid-
erable sentence concession must be
compelling In addition, plea bar-
gaining spares the defendant the
shame and indignity of a public
trial, including examination and
cross-examination.
At the same time, the prospect of a
significant sentence reduction means
considerable pressure for the defen-
dant to agree to the offer. As a lay-
person it is very difficult if not
impossible to evaluate the strength
of the prosecution's case, to calculate
the risk of a conviction after trial,
and to estimate the length of a pos-
sible sentence. Thus it is more than
likely that in domestic courts for-
mally innocent defendants, where
the prosecution would not have been
able to prove guilt beyond reason-
able doubt, have entered into a plea
agreement and thus discarded a high
chance of acquittal. The question
arises whether this could also happen
at the ICC. Considering the mani-
fold evidential problems of interna-
tional prosecutions and the very high
standard of defendants' rights in the
Rome Statute, the prosecution could
be tempted to offer high sentence
discounts to induce an admission of
guilt in an otherwise weak case.
Through this pressure plea bargain-
ing could deprive some defendants
of their fair trial rights.
Another danger for defendants is
the risk that the promised sentence
reduction is not awarded. The pros-
ecution can only recommend a sen-
tence to the Trial Chamber but the
Court is bound neither by recon-
mendation nor the agreement. A
full admission of guilt with an
expression of remorse might con-
vince the Court that a significantly
low sentence can be justified but the
defendant has to fear that the Court
will not accept the admission as a
sufficient sign of compunction and
as a mitigating circumstance. Even
in a case of charge bargaining, the
defendant is not offered much cer-
tainty. Similar to the ad hoc tribu-
nals, the judges at the ICC have very
broad sentencing discretion 5 and
can, even if some of the charges are
withdrawn, pass a severe sentence for
the remaining charges.
It is therefore important for the
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defendant that "at all times, he will
proceed cautiously, careful to
approach the court with reverence, to
exhibit remorse, and to display a def-
erential, respectful, and compliant
demeanour.""m Consequently, defen-
dants might not dare to claim all
their rights or appeal against interim
court decisions. Again this would
mean that the practice of plea bar-
gaining indirectly deprived defen
dants of their due process rights.
At the same time, defendants will
find it very hard to retract an admis-
sion of guilt once it is made." In the
instance of a redaction, the case will
be remitted to a different Trial
Chamber" but since there are only
seven judges at the Trial Division it
will be difficult for the defendant
not to suspect bias of the new
Chamber.9 Thus, defendants who
are offered a deal are expected to
take a significant risk whereas the
prosecution has nothing to lose.
This situation refutes the principle
of fair trial.
The ICTY introduced procedural
safeguards based on legal instru-
inents of the United States, which is
often called the cradle of plea bar-
gaining. Rule 62bis in the ICTY
Rules of Procedure and Evidence
provides for the minimum require-
ments under which the Tribunal can
accept a guilty plea. The Trial
Chamber has to satisfy itself that the
guilty plea has been made volun-
tarily, is informed and not equivocal,
and that there is a sufficient factual
basis for the crime and the participa-
tion of the accused in it. However, as
has been shown elsewhere, the Tri-
bunal rarely examines these require-
ments in any detail."
It is therefore questionable whether
a similar provision for the ICC could
sufficiently protect the defendant. It
could be argued that the defendant is
safeguarded against misuse of plea
bargaining by the defense counsel.
However, experience in the ad hoc
tribunals (the ICTY and ICTR) has
shown that frequently defendants dis-
trust international defense lawyers
and prefer national counsel who have
often little or no experience in inter-
national criminal procedures.
Further, if the defense counsel
comes from a system that does not
apply plea bargaining they might not
be familiar with this practice at all.
Considering the far reaching conse-
quences of an agreement this lack of
experience can be fatal. In the case
of Bosnian soldier Drazen Erdemovi
the defense counsel allegedly "neither
understood the concept of a guilty
plea nor comprehended the nature
of the charges against the client".'
However, Rule 62bis and Article 65
Rome Statute set out a judicial test.
Thus it is the Court's duty to protect
the defendant from any undue pres-
sure or submitting an uninformed
admission of guilt. The ICC should
therefore not delegate such a duty to
a defense lawyer, no matter how expe-
rienced the counsel is.
A third disadvantage of plea bar-
gaining from the defendant's stand-
point is that this practice results in
different treatment of offenders who
have committed comparable crimes.
Those defendants who can offer co-
operation, especially valuable infor-
mation against other defendants,
can benefit from concessions that
offenders of similar crimes cannot.
Thus similar crimes might be sen-
tenced unequally. However, this was
more of a problem for the ad hoc tri-
bunals who were dealing with defen-
dants of low as well as of high
responsibility. It is unlikely that the
ICC will face the same dilemma as it
will be restricted to a small number
of defendants accused of carrying
the most responsibility for the most
serious crimes.
Costs of proceedings
The major advantages of plea bar-
gaining for courts are the immense
savings in terms of time and
resources, as it offers a way to avoid a
full-length trial. For example, when
the ICTY was under considerable
pressure from the UN and the
United States to expedite proceed-
ings, it could hardly afford to reject
such an efficient practice.2
An international criminal trial is
on average not only much lengthier
than national proceedings but like-
wise much more costly. International
infrastructure for transport and
communication as well as security
measures for witnesses, defendants,
and court staff is needed. All docu-
ments need to be translated and
hearings simultaneously interpreted
into a number of languages. The
Court not only needs highly quali-
fied interpreters and translators
but also the newest IT technology
in the courtroom for the defense
and prosecution teams, the judges,
the clerks, the defendant, and the
witnesses. On top of this filming,
recording, and broadcasting equip-
ment is needed to facilitate trans-
parency and access for the public.
In addition to avoiding a full trial,
plea bargaining also contributes to
cost saving because it encourages
defendants to provide valuable evi-
dence in other cases, which frees tip
further resources for investigation.
Unfortunately, it will only be a
question of time before the ICC has
to face similar resource and caseload
problems as the ICTY. One would be
forgiven for thinking that the ICC
will not be as overworked as the ad
hoc tribunals because they do not
have a fixed mandate and thus do not
face the same pressure of a comple-
tion order as the UN courts did.
Furthermore, unlike the ad hoc
tribunals, the ICC is restricted to
deal with only those defendants sus-
pected of the most responsibility
rather than low-level offenders. In
addition, the principle of comple-
mentarity enables national states to
prosecute international criminals
and therefore, it is hoped, lighten
the burden of the ICC. However,
considering how occupied the ICC
already is now with only one trial, it
16. Julian A. Cook, Piea Bargaining at The
Hague, 30 YAL J FOR INT'L L. 173, at 491 (2005).
17, For example in the case of Dragoijub
Kunarac before the ICTY the Trial Chamber and
the parties agreed that the requirements of rule
62bis had not been nct, and the case proceeded
to trial on a presumption of innocence. Prosecutor
v. Knarac, Kovac, Vukovic, (Case No. IT-96-23-i)
Transcript (ICTY Trial Chamber II, March 13,
1998) at 44.
18. Article 65(4) (b) Rome Statute.
19. The ICC has at the moment i8 judges in total.
20. Regina RauxJoh, Negotiated Histor-The
Historical Recad in International Cirminal Law and
Plea Bargaining, 10 INT L CRM. L REV. 739 (2010).
21. Cook supra n. 16, at 499.
22. lt. at 477.
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can be expected to be overburdened
in the not too distant future. Further,
although the ICC does not have a
fixed mandate its funding derives
from the State Assembly who will
press the Court to work most
efficiently,
When considering the establish-
ment of international criminal tribu-
nals there was no doubt that
international criminal procedures
would be immensely costly even if
the actual costs and length might
have exceeded the worst fears. New
ertheless the international commu-
nity has decided to spend these
resources on providing for fair trials
and not, for instance, use the money
to rebuild the war torn society, For
this reason it cannot be justified to
save resources by avoiding these very
same trials. In view of available
resources the Rome Statute is already
setting out a number of case selec-
tion criteria, which in effect limit the
scope of justice. justice should not
however be diminished further
simply for efficiency. The Court has
to be clear that expediency alone is
not a valid reason to offer sentence
reductions. Nor is plea bargaining a
valid tool to reduce an overburden-
ing case load.
Access to evidence
The most compelling incentive for
plea bargaining for the ICC is argu-
ably the difficulties of international
criminal investigations compared
with national procedures. With
regards to the investigation, interna-
tional crime differs from domestic
crime in three principal facets: the
scale of the violence, the prosecu-
tion's dependency on state co-opera-
tion, and the difficulties of linking
the crime to high-profile offenders.
The huge number of acts commit-
ted in the context of international
crime renders every criminal
23. Article 17(l)(a) Rome Statute.
24. Article 86 Rome Statute.
25. According Article 87(7) Rome Statute the
matter can be referred to the State Assembty but
this body has no enforcemett power against state
parties.
26. Article 13(b) Rome Statute.
27. UN SC Resolution 1593(2005).
28. UN SC Resolution 1593(2005) para 2.
investigation extremely complex.
Typically, there are numerous perpe-
trators and the number of victims
and possible witnesses can run into
tens of thousands. The niagnitude of
the mayhem requires examining an
immense volume of forensic evi-
dence, witness testimony, expert
witness statements, and relevant doc-
uments. Most of the investigative
work has to be carried out in coun-
tries where the conflict might be
on-going and security for investiga-
tors aid witnesses uncertain.
What is more, in war torn regions
communication and transport in fra-
structures are often seriously inter-
rupted even after the conflict has
ended. The need for interpreters
during the interrogations arid trans-
lations of the relevant documents
pose further logistic difficulties.
Another problem is the length of the
investigation, which means witnesses
become less reliable. Child soldier
witnesses are, for example, asked to
recall words spoken to them when
they were half the age they are now.
What is even more problematic in
international investigation is the
ICC's lack of an investigation force
comparable to national police forces.
This means the prosecution is
dependent on state co-operation for
a number of different aspects
ranging from providing office space,
local police officers and interpreters
for taking witness statements, to
access to official documents and
archives or just visas to enter the
country. Moreover, the Court needs
state assistance to get access to both
witnesses and suspects because
unlike national courts the ICC does
not have subpoena powers. This
badly needed co-operation of the
state might not be forthcoming as
every international criminal investi-
gation is politically sensitive.
According to the principle of com-
plementarity only cases where the
relevant state is unable or unwilling
to prosecute itself are investigated by
the ICC."i In such a case it is ques-
tionable whether the same state
would be able or willing to provide
the necessary support to the prosecu-
tion. Member states of the ICC are
under the obligation to fully co-oper-
ate with the Court" but there is no
effective enforcement mechanism in
place to ensure such co-operation .
In the case where the relevant state is
not a member state but the United
Nations Security Council referred
the situation to the Court, the refer-
ral resolution should compel all states
to co-operate with the ICC.2' Regret-
tably, so far the Security Council has
not pursued this avenue. In its refer-
ral of the situation in Darfur to the
Court2 ' in 2005 the Security Council
acknowledged "that States not party
to the Rotme Statute have no obliga-
tion under the Statute" and "urged"
non-meuber States to co-operate
fully." State co-operation of both
member states and non-member
states is therefore in practice mainly
voluntary.
Finally, the third major difficulty
for the prosecution stems from the
ICC targeting only those perpetra-
tors who carry the greatest responsi-
bility for the crimes. This means
rather than dealing with offenders
of low- or middle-rank, ICC defen-
dants will come fromi the military,
political, or economic leadership.
These defendants are prosecuted
mainly not for crimes they have com-
mitted as principals but for planning
and ordering the mass atrocities.
Since high-rank officials usually do
not leave a paper-trail of their orders,
one of the biggest problems for the
prosecution is to prove the link
between defendant and the crime.
The victims can usually only identify
the trigger-pullers not the com-
mander who masterminded the
attack. Therefore, often it is only a
co-defendant in a similarly high
position in the chain of command
who has eye-witnessed the coin-
nander issuing orders and can
testify against him or her.
It is in this situation where plea
bargaining can play a crucial role in
accessing the only available evidence
by inducing co-defendants to testify
against their former leaders. Where
defendants hold the key to sufficient
evidence against the most responsible
perpetrator, plea bargaining might
be the only way to avoid an acquittal
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on grounds of lack of proof. Although
justice is reduced because a guilty
offender is awarded a reduced sen-
tence, overall more justice is gained
because an otherwise weak case
against the most responsible offender
is strengthened. Because of the intrin-
sic difficulties of investigations of
international crime set out above, the
situation where the key evidence
against the central defendant can
only be gained through a co-offender
might arise more often than antici-
pated. Thus, it is argued here that
plea bargaining is needed not as a
means of efficiency but as a tool of
gaining evidence to overcome the
inherent difficulties of international
criminal law.
Plea bargaining in the ICC
It has been shown that plea bargain-
ing has a significant impact on the
major themes of international crimi-
nal law such as justice, legitimacy of
the Court., peace and reconciliation,
the role of victims, the rights of the
defendant, the costs of the proceed-
ings, and access to evidence. Thus
any use of plea bargaining by the
ICC has to be carefully balanced with
these interests.
One question that was long debated
at the Rome Conference was what
consequence a declaration of guilt
should. have. While in civil law systems
a confession is a piece of evidence
-without procedural consequences as
such, in common law countries the
trial is concluded in case of a guilty
plea. A compromise was found, avoid-
ing the terms 'confession' and 'guilty
plea' and instead introducing the
'admission of guilt' in Article 65. As in
common law the admission of guilt
means the trial is concluded."
Leaning on the model of civil law
however, the Court has to examine
whether the admission is sustained by
the facts of the case" and otherwise
request a more complete presenta-
tion of the facts." Article 65(5)
neither allows nor forbids plea bar-
gaining explicity.1m On the one hand
it acknowledges settlements between
prosecution and defense and on the
other it emphasizes that the Court is
not bound by such agreements.
Since plea bargaining is neither
prescribed nor forbidden it remains
to be seen how the Court will choose
to apply their discretion to honour
the parties' agreements. If the Trial
Chambers were to develop a practice
of discounting agreements between
defense and prosecution it would be
impossible to develop a relationship
of trust in the long run and plea bar-
gaining could not develop into a
general practice. The defense
counsel in Dragan Nikoli's case felt
that the prosecutor had not hon-
oured the agreement and warned
that this "will be noted by those
whose duty it is to advise on the issue
of making a Plea Agreement with the
Prosecutor."'
If on the other hand the ICC
became known to generally respect
the agreements, plea bargaining
would thrive. Since the Rome Statute
invites or at least does not hinder
plea bargaining and, considering the
manifold advantages that were set
out above, the ICC might start using
plea bargaining once it has more
cases to cope with. This prediction is
supported by the fact that with the
completion of the ICTY many court
staff will move from that Tribunal,
where plea bargaining was used on a
regular basis, to the ICC.
Should the ICC
use plea bargaining?
Once the ICC has achieved the
difficult tasks of bringing a defen-
dant before the Court, it seems
not only contradictory but against
the very essence of the Court to
dispose of this very trial through
plea bargaining. However, in the
face of the very different goals
and circumstances of interna-
tional criminal justice compared
to domestic procedures the use of
plea bargaining might be not only
helpful but even necessary. Never-
theless, plea bargaining poses
some serious disadvantages, such
as the risk to defendants, victims'
interests, and the Court's legiti-
macy. Thus it is vital that plea
bargaining is only used in those
circumstances that can justify the
circumvention of a trial. Plea
bargaining should be allowed
only if a) the plea bargain leads to
the defendant offering new evi-
dence or contributes to reconcili-
ation and b) if high standards of
safeguards can be enforced.
When is plea bargaining justified?
It is submitted here that there are
only three functions that justify the
use of plea bargaining at the ICC.
First, considering the difficulties of
international criminal investigations,
the prosecutor should use plea bar-
gaining as a tool to gain otherwise
unavailable evidence against high-
ranking defendants who could oth-
erwise hide behind the power
hierarchy. Second, the use of plea
bargaining is justified where it can
encourage defendants to submit pre-
viously unknown facts that are an
essential addition to the historical
record and that otherwise might be
lost to public knowledge. Finally, a
plea bargain should be considered as
a tool of reconciliation when it
incites an admission of guilt, expres-
sion of remorse, and acknowledg-
ment of the victims' suffering. The
ICC will need to develop relevant
criteria and indicators to make such
evaluation over the years based on
experience and in cooperation with
different stakeholders.
In order to be able to restrict the
use of plea bargaining to these three
circumstances the ICC has to be
careful to avoid a situation where the
need for efficiency makes trials less
favourable than plea arrangements.
The Court should therefore be very
strict on its case selection criteria and
ensure that it only indicts as many
suspects as it can afford to provide a
full trial. Unlike the ad hoc tribunals
29. Article 65(2) Rome Statute.
30. Article 65(1) (c) Rome Statute.
31 The Trial Chramber may order summary
proceedings where the prosecution can present
additional evidence or order a full trial (Article
65(4)) Rome Statute.
32. Article 65 (5) reads: "Any discussions
between the Prosecutor and dhe defence regard-
ing modification of the charges the admission of
guilt or the penalty to be impocsed shall not be
binding on the Court."
33. Proserutor v. Draor ikoli Case No. IT-94-
2-A, Appellant's Brief in Reply to the Prosecution
Respondent's Brief (Aug 25, 2004) page 5, cited
in Nancy Armoury Combs, Procunring Guilty Pleas
for Intemnational Crimes: The Limited Inflnence of Sen
lenceDiscounts, 59 A)ND L. Rrv. 69, at 99 (2006).
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the ICC should focus on leaders only.
The Court has to remember that
its mandate is not to provide justice
for all involved parties. This is still
the role of the national courts. Sec-
ondly, in order to establish general
elements such as the existence of an
attack against a civilian population
or an armed conflict, the Trial
Chambers should consider saving
time and resources by using evi-
dence from previous cases. The
Court should avoid situations like in
the ICTY where some expert wit-
nesses were asked to give the same
evidence at different trials. 4
In addition, the need for using
plea bargaining to overcome eviden-
tial problens should be diminished
by improving state cooperation.
Experience shows that the interna-
tional community is able to put con-
siderable pressure on national states
to co-operate if there is political
will." Both the United Nations as
well as involved states must be aware
of the impact their co-operation or
lack thereof will have oi the proce-
dures of the ICC.
High standard of safeguards. If
the ICC decides to use plea bargain-
ing, it has to warrant that the rule of
law is not undermined. The Court
can only safeguard the rights of the
defendant if it examines all the
requirements of Article 65 thor-
oughly. Article 65 requires the Trial
Chamber to ensure that the admis-
sion was made voluntarily and with
an understanding of the nature and
consequences of the admission. 6 If
the elements of Article 65(1) are not
met, the Trial Chamber has to
proceed to trial and the admission of
guilt is deemed not to have been
made '1
Learning from the experience of
the ad hoc tribunals, it has to be
asked whether the Trial Chambers
34. DA. Mndis, Improvig the Operation and
Functioning of the Iernational (rininal Mibunal,
94 AJIL 759, 775 (2000)
35. For example, in 2001 the U.S. threatened
YVgoslavia to withhold financial support from the
IMF and the World Bank and millions of U.S.
dollars in ditect econoinc assistance if Slobodan
Milosevic, who had been indicted by the ICTY
was not aiested.
36. This provision is based on Rule 62bis of the
ICTYRPE and Rule 62(y) of ICTR RPE.
37. Anicle 65(S) Rome Statute-
will apply the safeguards of Article
65 with sufficient endeavour since
they take up time and resources and
might also discourage plea agree-
ments. The Court must not only
ascertain that the admission of guilt
was made voluntarily but in addition
that the defendant understands in
full detail the extent of the rights
they are surrendering. A provision
should be added to the Rules of Pro-
cedure and Evidence that requires
the Trial Chamber to inform the
defendant explicitly about the conse-
quences of an admission of guilt and
the fact that the Court is bound to
an earlier agreement with the pros-
ecution. This clarification has to be
issued by the Court and must not be
left to defense counsel.
Furthermore, so far the Rome
Statute does not address any partici-
pation of the Trial Chamber in any
negotiations. If there was involve-
ment and the Chamber has indi-
cated certain consequences in case
of an admission of guilt the Court
should be bound by this indication
unless new circumstances, for
example new evidence of aggravat-
ing factors, should arise. Carefully
examining the requirements of
Article 65 and fully informing the
defendant mean prolonging the
hearing and reducing the timesav-
ing effect of the plea bargain. Com-
pared to a full trial, however, this
procedure will still have saved a sub-
stantial amount of time. More
importantly, both are indispensable
safeguards to protect the defendant
as well as the legitimacy of the prac-
tice of plea bargaining at the ICC.
Conclusions
Ideally, the factually guilty high-
profile offender would be convicted
and given an appropriate sentence
after a full trial in which a historical
record of the conflict had been
established and the leader's involve-
ment proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Like most national criminal
justice systems, the ICC will without
doubt be very overworked in the
near future. Too many armed con-
flicts are fought around the world
with too many crimies committed by
numerous perpetrators who are
attacking a vast number of victims.
At the same tine, the Rome
Statute exceeds the minimun stant-
dard of international human rights
and provides for a range of defen-
dants' as well as victims' rights. It
can be expected that each case will
take several years of trial and appeal
procedures, which will diSillusiOnt
victims as well as the general public.
This is mainly a resource issue that
needs to be addressed by increased
funding and possibly the appoint-
ient of more judges and prosecu-
tors. Additionally, more pressure
should be put on national states to
deal with these atrocities in munici-
pal courts. The ICC must make sure
it limits its cases to a number it can
afford to try.
As has been shown, plea bargain-
ing can support the main goals of
international criminal justice if used
carefully. The danger is that the
need for efficiency will overshadow
other values. It is therefore argued
here that it is vital for the IC(C when
developing a practice of plea bar-
gaining, to restrict sentence dis-
counts due to plea agreements under
strict safeguards.
The working pressure of a close-
knit network will be immensely high
on both judges and prosecutors, but
the Court mnust not forget that riot
only the interests of defendants,
victims, and the public but also the
legitimacy of the ICC depends on
their exercise of plea agreements
and sentence discounts. Ani ICC that
used plea bargaining excessively and
disposed of too many trials because
of plea bargaining would alienate
both victims and states already
opposing the Court. A few full trials
serve justice better than a high
number of quick convictions that are
not considered legitimate, The ICC
has no power other than its legiti-
macy, and loss of legitimacy and a
feeling that the Court is bypassing its
mandate cannot be afforded. F-
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